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though an excise tax created a lien
upon the land between the time the
property was sold and the time the tax
was paid, this lien did not convert the
tax into a tax upon real estate; it remained a tax upon the Indians' activity
of selling the land. Id. at 693-94.
In County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act explicitly authorized taxation of fee patented land but
not taxation with respect to or involving land, or based upon the value of
land. As a result, counties are forbidden to impose an excise tax on fee
patented land. While this decision
clarified the limits upon which a county
may tax fee patented property held by
individual tribe members, it also deprived these Indians ofthe federal protection from state and local taxation
originally given to them by Congress.

- Carolyn M Brennan
Dawson v. Delaware: EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S RACIST ASSOCIATIONS OR BELIEFS NOT
ADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING UNLESS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE UNDERL YING CONVICTION.
In Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct.
1093 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that in a capital sentencing proceeding, evidence of the
defendant's membership in a racist
prison gang was inadmissible because
it was not relevant to the issues being
decided at the penalty proceeding or
related to the underlying conviction.
In vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware, the Court
determined that the admission of a
stipulation evidencing the defendant's
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution.
David Dawson and three other inmates escaped from a Delaware prison
in late 1986. After burglarizing a house
in Kenton, Delaware, Dawson pro24 - The Law ForumJ22.3

ceeded to another house nearby where
he brutally murdered a white woman
and then stole her car and money.
Dawson was subsequently apprehended
by the police.
At trial, the jury convicted Dawson
of first-degree murder, possession ofa
deadly weapon during the commission
of a felony, and various other crimes.
A penalty hearing was then held before
the jury to determine whether to impose the death penalty for the first
degree murder conviction.
The State notified the court that it
intended to introduce expert testimony
pertaining to Dawson's membership
in a prison gang known as the Aryan
Brotherhood ("Brotherhood") as well
as evidence of Dawson's tatoos and
other indicia of his membership in the
Brotherhood. The State submitted that
such testimony would explain the origin and nature of the Brotherhood.
Dawson opposed admission of such
evidence arguing that its admission
would be inflammatory and would violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Prior to the start of the penalty
hearing, the parties agreed upon a negotiated stipulation concerning the
evidence of the defendant's membership in the Brotherhood. In essence,
the stipulation stated that the Brotherhood was a white racist prison gang
which originated in California and that
separate gangs existed in Delaware
using the same name. As a condition
of the stipulation, the State did not
introduce expert testimony during the
penalty phase.
During the penalty hearing, the State
introduced the stipulation, Dawson's
tatoos relating to the Brotherhood, his
use of the name "Abaddan," and his
lengthy criminal record. In rebuttal,
Dawson presented mitigating "good
character" evidence consisting oftestimony of family members and records
of his enrollment in drug and alcohol
programs in prison for which he had
received good time credits.
The jury concluded that the mitigating evidence was outweighed by

the aggravating evidence and recommended that Dawson receive the death
penalty. Upon that binding recommendation, Dawson was so sentenced.
The Supreme Court of Delaware,
holding that it was desirable for the
jury to have as much information before it as possible during the penalty
hearing, affirmed the underlying conviction and the death penalty. The
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the admission of evidence concerning
Dawson's membership in the Brother-'
hood during the sentencing proceeding
violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional rights.
The Court began its analysis by
addressing Dawson's argument that
theFirst Amendment absolutely barred
the admission of evidence of an
individual's beliefs or associations
during a sentencing proceeding.
Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1096. While
recognizing that the First Amendment
protects an "individual's right to join
groups and associate with others," the
Court rejected Dawson's assertion because it was overly broad. Id. By
doing so, the Court reinforced its previous position that the sentencing authority is "free to consider a wide range
of relevant material," even that material which may otherwise be constitutionally protected. Id. at 1097.
Having recognized that in certain
instances otherwise constitutionally
protected material may be admitted
during a sentencing proceeding, the
Court then considered whether the admission of the stipulation as to
Dawson's membership in the Delaware chapter of the Brotherhood was
constitutional error. Id. at 1097. The
touchstone ofthe Court's inquiry was
whether the stipulation was in any way
relevant to the issues to be determined
in the sentencing proceeding. Id.
The Court first noted that the absence of expert testimony to show the
violent nature of the Brotherhood limitedthe relevancy ofthe admitted stipulation. Id. The Court reasoned that the
narrow phrasing ofthe stipulation said

nothing about the character ofthe Delaware chapter ofthe Brotherhood since
it failed to link the beliefs of the California chapter to the Delaware chapter.
Id. at 1098. The Court thus concluded
that the narrow phrasing ofthe stipulation impermissibly invited the jury to
infer that the abstract beliefs of the
Delaware chapter were identical to those
of the California chapter. Id.
The Court assumed for the sake of
argument that the beliefs of the Delaware chapter were shown to be racist,
concluded that evidence of Dawson's
membership in the Brotherhood was
nevertheless irrelevant because both
Dawson and his victim were of the
same race. Id. The Court distinguished Dawson from other cases
where it had held membership in an
organization to be relevant for sentencing purposes. In those cases, the membership was in some way related to the
underlying crime of conviction and
probative of the defendant's bias or
indicative of his propensity for future
violence. Id. (citingBarciayv. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983)) For example, in
Barclay, the defendant's membership
in the Black Liberation Army was relevant in a sentencing proceeding because the underlying conviction was
for the murder of a white hitchhiker.
Similarly, in United States v. Abel, 469
U.S. 45 (1984), the evidence of the
defendant's and a defense witness'
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
was relevant because the members
were sworn to lie on behalf of each
other.
Unlike these cases cited by the
Court, the stipulation as to Dawson's
membership in the Delaware chapter
of the Brotherhood was not related to
the underlying conviction and did not
establish that the Brotherhood had a
propensity for violent acts. Therefore,
Dawson's membership in the Brotherhood was not relevant to the sentencing proceeding. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at
1098.
Finally, the Court rejected the state's
assertion that the stipulation was relevant to prove any aggravating cir-

cated by mere courtroom repetition,
the Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause did not require proof of
unavailability before the statements
were permitted under exceptions to the
hearsay doctrine.
Petitioner, Randall D. White, was
charged with the sexual assault ofS. G~,
a four year old girl. Trial testimony
established that on April 16, 1988,
S.G.'s babysitter, Tony DeVore, was
awakened by screams coming from
S.G.'s room. Upon nearing S.G.'s
bedroom, DeVore witnessed White
leaving the room. DeVore identified
White as a friend ofthe child's mother,
Tammy Grigsby. According to
DeVore's trial testimony, S.G. stated
that White had put his hand over her
mouth, choked her, threatened to whip
her ifshe screamed, and had "touch[ed]
her in the wrong places" (indicating
the vaginal area).
S.G. 's mother found her daughter
"scared" and a "little hyper" when she
returned home about thirty minutes
after DeVore had first been awakened.
S. G. repeated her claims to her mother,
which led Grigsby to call the police.
Officer Terry Lewis questioned S.G.
alone upon arrival at the Grigsby residence a few minutes later. Lewis'
- David E. Canter summary of S. G. 's statements at trial
indicated that, again, the child had
White v. Illinois: SPONTANEOUS given the same account oftheevening's
DECLARATION AND MEDICAL events. The hospital personnel who
EXAMINATION HEARSAY EX- examinedS.G. that night, nurse Cheryl
CEPTIONS DO NOT OFFEND Reents and Dr. Michael Meinzen, heard
SIXTH AMENDMENT CON- essentially the identical story S.O. told
FRONTATION CLAUSE RE- DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis.
S.O. did not testify at petitioner's
QUIREMENTSREGARDLESS OF
DECLARANT'S AVAILABILITY. trial, due to emotional difficulty upon
In White v. IllinOis, 112 S. Ct. 736 entering the courtroom. DeVore,
(1992), the United States Supreme Grigsby, Lewis, Reents, and Meinzen
Court held that the Confrontation testified at trial, all relating the account
Clause of the Sixth Amendment ofthe ofthe incident as told to them by S.G.
U.S. Constitution does not require a Petitioner objected on hearsay grounds
declarant to testify at trial or be found to the testimony of these witnesses,
unavailable by the trial court where the regarding S.G. 's statements to them.
declarant's testimony can be admitted The trial court overruled each objecunder an established hearsay excep- tion on the basis of relevant hearsay
tion. Because the declarant's out-of- exceptions. Testimony given by
court statements carried substantial pro- DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis was adbative value that could not be dupli- mitted under the spontaneous declaracumstance. Id. The Court recognized
that in certain instances membership in
an organization, such as one that endorses racial killing, may be relevant
to the jury's inquiry as to whether a
defendant would be likely to commit
futureviolentacts. However, the Court
reasoned that the inference which the
jury was invited to draw from the stipulation proved nothing more than the
abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter of the Brotherhood. The Court
concluded that with nothing more than
an abstract showing of Dawson's beliefs, the admission of the stipulation
violated Dawson's First Amendment
rights. Id.
In Dawson v. Delaware, the United
States Supreme Court refined the test
for determining the admissibility of
evidence oforganizational associations
and beliefs in a sentencing proceeding.
Evidence ofa defendant's associations
or abstract beliefs must be relevant to
the issues being decided or related to
the underlying conviction in order to
protect a defendant's First Amendment
rights. This decision illustrates the
Court's fear that the defendant may be
unfairly prejudiced by the admission
of such evidence.
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